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DISCLOSURE OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE ORTHOPAEDIC FIELD 
AND IN MEDICAL EDUCATION. Brian L. Ju, Christopher P. Miller, Peter G. 
Whang, Jonathan N. Grauer. Department of Orthopaedics and Rehabilitation, Yale 
University, School of Medicine, New Haven, CT. 
The purpose of this study was to determine the variability in disclosure information reported by 
authors at three annual orthopaedic conferences in the same year. Furthermore, we examined the number of 
medical schools with disclosure policies regarding educational activities and the acceptance of gifts from 
industry (law school policies were similarly analyzed for comparison). We hypothesize there will be 
significant variability in disclosure of conflicts of interest in both the professional and educational arena. 
The author disclosure information published for the 2008 North American Spine Society (NASS), 
Cervical Spine Research Society (CSRS), and Scoliosis Research Society (SRS) conferences were 
compiled into a database and examined. Online disclosure policies for all 131 accredited medical schools 
and all 200 accredited law schools were evaluated during August/September 2009. 
 Disclosure records were available for 1,231 authors at NASS, 550 at CSRS, and 642 at SRS. Of the 
153 authors who presented at the NASS and CSRS meetings, 51% exhibited discrepancies in their 
disclosure information. Of the 131 accredited medical schools, 98% (vs. 18% of law schools) had protocols 
in place requiring faculty to disclose their financial relationships to their institutions. Only a small 
percentage of both medical and law schools required lecturers to disclose these associations with students. 
40% of medical schools (vs. 1% of law schools) had established policies limiting gifts from industry. 
These findings emphasize the significant variability that currently exists in the reporting of 
financial conflicts of interest by authors who presented at three major spine conferences. We believe these 
discrepancies are likely due to confusion regarding what relationships should be acknowledged in certain 
situations and the clear lack of uniformity among the disclosure policies. Not only in the professional arena, 
but the widespread implementation of disclosure guidelines in medical schools emphasizes the 
acknowledged need to regulate physician-industry relationships. The varied policies addressing faculty 
disclosures and the acceptance of gifts demonstrate that the regulation to these relationships remains 
inconsistent.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Conflicts of Interest in Orthopaedics 
 As the resources for scientific endeavors offered by traditional sources of funding 
such as the National Institutes of Health have continued to decline, private industry has 
taken on a greater role in providing financial support and other opportunities to 
physicians. These arrangements allow companies to take advantage of the knowledge and 
experience of clinicians while facilitating the completion of studies that are of interest to 
both parties. These physician-industry interactions may take on various forms, including 
research grants, consulting agreements, advisory board positions, royalties, or stock 
options; given their value to these companies, it is not unreasonable for these clinicians to 
expect to be fairly compensated for their time and effort on these projects. 
 Although these partnerships may in many cases foster advances in medical care 
and technology, there are growing concerns regarding the negative consequences of 
clinicians working closely with industry [1-5]. Many critics have suggested that these 
relationships may unduly influence the professional judgment of clinicians who are 
otherwise bound to place the welfare of their patients above all else. For instance, any 
investigators with a direct financial stake in the outcomes of a study are particularly 
susceptible to bias which may compromise the veracity of their research at any point 
from the conception of the experimental design [6] to the actual analysis and 
interpretation of results [7,8]. As a result, these associations have come under greater 
scrutiny in recent years as the prevalence of industry-sponsored studies has increased. 
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 One initial strategy that has been widely implemented in an attempt to limit the 
effects of industry involvement on scientific inquiries is to establish an environment of 
transparency so that all of an individual physician’s corporate ties are readily available to 
the public [9]. However, the goal of disclosure is not necessarily to eliminate all sources 
of bias but to inform the readership of the existence of possible conflicts of interest 
(COIs) and allow them to draw their own conclusions about the objectivity of the authors 
[10]. Some critics of mandatory disclosure insist that financial incentives represent only 
one of many factors that investigators take into consideration when performing a study 
and is therefore unlikely to alter the findings to a great extent [11]. Regardless, the 
scientific community has strongly advocated disclosure as a method for protecting the 
integrity of the research process, and the majority of journals and conferences have 
adopted some mechanism for the reporting of financial disclosure information [12]. 
 There are generally two types of disclosure policies that are being implemented, 
one of which requires authors to simply reveal the relationships that are germane to the 
research being presented [13] while the other entails the comprehensive documentation of 
all of their financial dealings with industry regardless of whether they are relevant to the 
current investigation [14,15]. While both of these approaches are intended to maintain the 
transparency of clinician-scientists, the inconsistencies between these two sets of 
guidelines and their often ambiguous definitions of what constitutes a true conflict of 
interest (COI) has led to continuing confusion among physicians and may even yield 
inappropriate or inadequate disclosure of their industry ties. Nevertheless, the clarity and 
effectiveness of these two disclosure protocols have not been well characterized. The 
purpose of this part of the investigation was to compare the self-reported disclosure 
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information of authors attending three major spine conferences in the same calendar year 
(2008 annual meetings of the North American Spine Society, Cervical Spine Research 
Society, and Scoliosis Research Society) and to quantify the variability between their 
published data. 
 
Conflicts of Interest in Medical Education 
Much like their counterparts in the post-graduate stage, medical schools often rely 
on partnerships with commercial entities to ensure continuing progress in biomedical 
research and student education. However, such relationships have come under closer 
scrutiny in recent years, in part because of their potential to influence medical education 
[16-22].  
The primary concern is that COIs arise when physicians in academia form 
relationships with industry which may affect both their clinical and research endeavors.  
Financial relationships that directly result in personal or monetary gain such as grant 
support, stocks, and consulting positions, clearly represent potential COIs, but even 
seemingly less significant patterns of interaction with industry exemplified by travel 
reimbursements, honoraria, office supplies, and other gifts have been shown to subtly 
bias physicians’ judgments and possibly manipulate their perceptions over time [23-26]. 
In an effort to bolster public trust in our nation’s medical institutions, as well as to 
ensure the continued integrity of medical education and biomedical research, the 
Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) and the Accreditation Council for 
Continuing Medical Education (ACCME) have published guidelines to assist members in 
managing industry collaborations in accord with higher standards of medical 
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professionalism. Aside from focusing on many aspects of the interactions that exist 
between industry and individuals in academia, these recommendations also underscore 
the importance of this issue [27,28].  
The influence of commercial entities on the field of medicine may affect 
physicians at every level of training. In particular, the degree of interaction industry has 
had with medical professionals throughout all of the stages in their education raises 
questions about the overt or subtle effects of this presence in academic settings, including 
the classroom or laboratory.  For example, a recent New York Times article describes a 
pharmacology professor at Harvard Medical School who touted the benefits of 
cholesterol-lowering drugs and inappropriately minimized their side-effects without 
acknowledging to his students that he was a consultant to several pharmaceutical 
companies that market these types of medications [29]. These and other similar incidents 
illustrate how industry affiliations may sway both practicing physicians and the next 
generation of healthcare providers. 
One method that has been proposed for enhancing the transparency of individuals 
who educate medical students is the mandatory disclosure of their industry relationships 
to their students. This approach has been widely adopted by medical journals and 
professional societies which have proven this strategy to be reasonably effective for 
regulating these collaborations [9-12]. Similar policies requiring medical school faculty 
to disclose their COIs may be equally as beneficial for maintaining their transparency. 
This information may allow students to form their own judgments about the merits of 
lectures given by individuals with industry connections. By emphasizing the necessity of 
divulging these relationships, these protocols may also compel physicians-in-training to 
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be cognizant of the impact of commercial ties and hopefully serve as a framework to 
guide them during their subsequent interactions with corporate interests in the future. 
While faculty disclosure has taken on increasing significance among medical 
practitioners, it is unclear how prevalent these policies are in other professions (that are 
often held to similar ethical benchmarks), such as the legal community. COIs inevitably 
arise between lawyers and third parties but the American Bar Association (ABA), which 
provides accreditation of law schools and is the legal analog to the AAMC, does not 
mandate disclosure at its educational programs or insist that its institutions address 
attorney-industry relationships in a certain fashion [30]. Thus, the manner in which this 
issue is discussed is solely determined by each individual law school.   
The purpose of this part of the study was to quantify the number of medical 
schools with policies that specifically require faculty disclosure of financial relationships 
to their institutions and/or their students and to characterize their policies regarding the 
acceptance of gifts from industry. In addition, these guidelines were compared with any 
analogous protocols implemented by law schools in an attempt to assess the relative 
importance of reporting COIs within each respective field and to provide a larger 
perspective on this issue.   
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OBJECTIVES 
 
 
The purpose of this study was to determine the variability in disclosure 
information reported by authors at three annual orthopaedic conferences in the same year. 
Furthermore, we examined the number of medical schools with disclosure policies 
regarding educational activities and the acceptance of gifts from industry (law school 
policies were similarly analyzed for comparison). We hypothesize there will be 
significant variability in disclosure of conflicts of interest in both the professional and 
educational arena. 
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METHODS 
 
 
COI in Orthopaedics 
  
 We retrospectively reviewed the disclosure listings for all of the authors 
presenting at the 2008 North American Spine Society (NASS), Cervical Spine Research 
Society (CSRS), and Scoliosis Research Society (SRS) conferences which were printed 
in the final program for each meeting. Individuals submitting abstracts to these meetings 
were obliged to declare their potential conflicts of interest by February 2008 for NASS 
and SRS, whereas the corresponding deadline for CSRS was June 2008. Although it is 
possible that the disclosure status of a participant may have changed during the few 
months between these dates, we operated under the assumption that the incidence of any 
such modifications would be minimal. 
 The official disclosure policies for these meetings were obtained from the website 
of the sponsoring society and corroborated by the corresponding program brochures as 
well as by phone calls to the respective societies (see Appendix). According to these 
references, NASS and CSRS requested that surgeons report any and all financial 
relationships regardless of their relevance to the research being presented, while SRS 
only solicited disclosures that were directly connected to that particular study.  
 Since the guidelines established by NASS and CSRS were analogous, we were 
able to compare the industry affiliations of authors who attended these conferences 
because their disclosures would supposedly be identical. For example, a surgeon 
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acknowledging three industry associations to NASS who registered the same three 
entities with CSRS would be classified as displaying “no discrepancies.” However, 
another author who recorded three conflicts of interest to NASS but only revealed two to 
CSRS would be considered to have “1 discrepancy.” 
 In contrast, the project-specific policy implemented by SRS made it necessary to 
employ a different strategy to compare this data to that generated by NASS and CSRS. 
For those who presented their work at the SRS and either or both of the other meetings, it 
would be expected that all of the collaborations declared to SRS should also have been 
listed by NASS or CSRS under their global disclosure policies. If all of the industry 
entanglements that an author reported to SRS were also noted within the larger set of 
financial relationships supplied to NASS or CSRS, he or she was thought to possess “no 
discrepancies.” Similarly, individuals who had no conflicts of interest at SRS but were 
found to have one or more at NASS or CSRS were still deemed as having “no 
discrepancy” because these investigators may not have had any commercial ties related to 
their studies yet still possess other financial interests that did not have to be conveyed to 
SRS (but would still have to be shared with NASS and CSRS). Conversely, a disclosure 
that was published at the SRS conference but not at the NASS or CSRS conventions was 
categorized as “1 discrepancy”.  
 For the purpose of comparison, all of the researchers were segregated into 3 
separate groups based upon which two of the three meetings they had attended: 
NASS/CSRS; SRS/NASS; and SRS/CSRS. In each cohort we identified the authors with 
no changes in their listings and those with discrepancies in the disclosures that they had 
divulged to the two societies, focusing on those who had apparently had no affiliations at 
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one convention but declared one or more financial interests at the other. Furthermore, we 
also recorded the number of different industry relationships each individual with 
consistent data had acknowledged, as well as the number of discrepancies that existed 
between the information submitted to the two conferences by participants who exhibited 
variability in their disclosure status. 
 
COI in Medical Education 
 
Medical School Review 
A list of the 131 medical schools accredited by the Association of American 
Medical Colleges (AAMC) was obtained from its official website (www.aamc.org). The 
disclosure policies and physician-industry interaction protocols for all of these 
institutions are publically available and were acquired from each school’s website during 
the month of August 2009.  
 
Disclosure policy to students 
Each disclosure policy was analyzed using several criteria. First, we noted which 
medical schools had established formal guidelines requiring classroom lecturers to 
disclose their industry affiliations to their students. We subsequently determined whether 
the institution had similar policies dictating that faculty members divulge their 
commercial ties to students with whom they would be performing research. Finally, we 
calculated the proportion of medical schools that were also accredited by the 
Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education (ACCME). 
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The rationale for characterizing the proportion of ACCME-accredited medical 
schools was that this organization issues specific guidelines to its member institutions 
regarding disclosure of industry relationships. [13] These ACCME directives apply to 
individuals who seek Continuing Medical Education (CME) credits or participate in these 
events. According to these regulations, lecturers at sanctioned speaking engagements 
must disclose any relevant commercial ties prior to the beginning of the educational 
activity. Even though the ACCME protocol is not necessarily part of medical schools’ 
formal policies, the adherence to these principles reflects an increasing awareness of the 
importance of acknowledging COIs to those in attendance and maintaining full 
transparency. 
 
Physician-industry interaction policy 
Each medical school’s policy regarding physician-industry interactions was also 
reviewed for statements that related to the acceptance of gifts by physicians or other 
academic faculty from commercial entities. We quantified the proportion of medical 
schools that explicitly prohibited the receipt of gifts and/or defined the types of items that 
were allowed. 
 
Law School Review  
A similar evaluation of law schools was performed for the purpose of comparison 
to the data collected for the medical schools. The 200 law schools accredited by the 
American Bar Association (ABA) were identified from its official website 
(www.aba.org). The disclosure guidelines and policies for attorney-industry interactions 
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of these institutions are all publicly available and were recorded from each school’s 
website. All protocols were analyzed using the same methods that were described 
previously for the medical school policies during the month of September 2009.   
While law schools are accredited by the American Bar Association, there is no 
national governing body equivalent to the ACCME that oversees legal education; in each 
state this responsibility is generally fulfilled by its supreme court or another designated 
committee. The American Academy of Law Schools (AALS) is a close analog of the 
AAMC that supports legal education, but it is not involved in the accreditation of law 
schools. 
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RESULTS 
 
 
COI in Orthopaedics 
 
Disclosure information was available for 1,231 authors at NASS, 550 at CSRS, 
and 642 at SRS; of these researchers, 278 (NASS), 129 (CSRS), and 181 (SRS) also 
presented at one of the other conferences with 40 having listings for all three conferences. 
The three data sets analyzed in this study were comprised of 153 individuals for 
NASS/CSRS, 205 for SRS/NASS, and 56 for SRS/CSRS which represents 334 out of the 
total of 2,049 possible author combinations derived from all three conferences (Figure 1). 
The mean (± standard deviation) and median number of disclosures for these authors 
were 1.8 ± 3.5 and 1, respectively.  
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Figure 1. Venn diagram delineating the general disclosure policies of each organization and classifying the 
authors who attended the three conferences. 
 
NASS and CSRS 
153 authors presented at the NASS and CSRS meetings, both of which required 
disclosure of all industry collaborations regardless of their relevance. 51% of this group 
was noted to have contradictory information of which 32% had one discrepancy, 24% 
possessed two, and 44% demonstrated three or more. In addition, 45% of these 
individuals affirmed that they had “nothing to disclose” at one of the conferences yet 
informed the other society of at least one financial relationship (Figure 2a, 2b). 
 
NASS 
Instructions- Disclose everything 
Total: 1231 
CSRS 
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Figure 2a. Proportion of authors attending NASS and CSRS who were noted to have discrepancies in their 
disclosure information for the two conferences, including the number of discrepancies exhibited by 
individuals with inconsistencies as well as the number of industry relationships reported by those without 
any discrepancies.  
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Figure 2b. Proportion of authors attending NASS and CSRS with documented discrepancies that identified 
no disclosures at one conference but declared at least one conflict of interest at the other. 
 
 The other 49% of authors attending NASS and SRS were completely consistent in 
their reporting with the majority (67%) having no industry associations while 20% and 
13% named one versus two or more commercial entities, respectively (Figure 2a). This 
trend of researchers with accurate disclosure statements typically having no conflicts of 
interest was apparent for all three pairs of meetings (Figure 2a, 3a, 4a). 
 
SRS and NASS 
Unlike the global disclosure guidelines of NASS and CSRS, SRS utilized a more 
limited policy that involved the declaration of any financial ties that were specific to that 
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investigation.  According to the results of this assessment, only 9% of the 205 authors 
presenting research at both SRS and NASS demonstrated irregularities in their 
information, with 95% having one discrepancy and 5% revealing two or more. Moreover, 
42% of surgeons with disparities had indicated that they had “nothing to disclose” in 
response to the all-inclusive requirements of NASS while confirming the existence of at 
least one industry affiliation to SRS (Figure 3a, 3b). 
 
 
Figure 3a. Proportion of authors attending SRS and NASS who were noted to have discrepancies between 
their project-specific disclosures at SRS and their global disclosures at NASS, including the number of 
discrepancies exhibited by individuals with inconsistencies as well as the number of industry relationships 
reported by those without any discrepancies. 
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Figure 3b. Proportion of authors attending SRS and NASS with documented discrepancies that identified 
no disclosures at NASS but declared at least one conflict of interest at SRS. 
 
The other 91% of authors with research investigations at both SRS and NASS 
were found to have uniform reporting of their conflicts of interest. Although the 
preponderance (74%) of these researchers had no disclosures, 13% listed one source of 
industry support and another 13% admitted to having two or more (Figure 3a). 
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50% of those with inconsistencies marked “nothing to disclose” as part of their global 
disclosures to CSRS but cited at least one financial relationship at the SRS convention 
(Figure 4a, 4b). 
 
 
Figure 4a. Proportion of authors attending SRS and CSRS who were noted to have discrepancies between 
their project-specific disclosures at SRS and their global disclosures at CSRS, including the number of 
discrepancies exhibited by individuals with inconsistencies as well as the number of industry relationships 
reported by those without any discrepancies. 
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Figure 4b. Proportion of authors attending SRS and CSRS with documented discrepancies that identified 
no disclosures at CSRS but declared at least one conflict of interest at SRS. 
 
The remaining 82% of this cohort displayed no discrepancies between what they 
had furnished to SRS and CSRS. A large proportion (76%) of these researchers 
maintained that they had no financial interests with 9% and 15% designating either one or 
more than one industry relationship, respectively (Figure 4a). 
 
COI in Medical Education 
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Of the 131 AAMC-accredited medical schools, 98% had policies in place 
requiring faculty members to disclose their financial relationships to their institution, and 
92% of the schools were accredited by the ACCME (Figure 5). However, just 4% of the 
medical schools were found to have formal guidelines obliging lecturers to divulge their 
commercial interests to students prior to the beginning of an educational activity, and 5% 
of these institutions expected faculty to convey their industry affiliations to those 
engaging in joint research projects. Only 2% of all medical schools expected disclosure 
information to be reported to individuals in both of these situations.   
 
 
Figure 5. Proportion of AAMC-accredited medical schools that have policies requiring faculty disclosure 
to students. 
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Physician-industry interaction policies 
Although 22% of medical schools prohibited the receipt of any item from an 
industry source regardless of its monetary value, more than half (60%) had no preemptive 
restrictions on the acceptance of gifts (Figure 6). The remaining 18% of institutions set 
specific limits for these gifts; of this cohort of schools, 15% allowed the acceptance of 
nominal benefits related to “academic pursuits” (i.e. office supplies, honoraria, or travel 
reimbursements) and 3% capped the total value of gifts accepted to less than $300 
annually. 
 
 
Figure 6. Medical school policies on the acceptance of industry gifts by faculty. 
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Law School Policies 
Of the 200 law schools accredited by the ABA, 18% had adopted policies 
requiring faculty to disclose their financial relationships to their institution (Figure 7). 
However, none of these institutions stipulated that lecturers acknowledge their industry 
relationships to students prior to the beginning of an educational activity or embarking on 
research endeavors. Only 1% of law schools regulated the gifts that professors were able 
to accept from commercial interests; moreover, the protocols that did exist were vague 
and did not include actual dollar amounts or values. 
 
 
Figure 7. A comparison between medical and law school faculty disclosure policies during lectures and 
research activities. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
 
The issue of physician-industry conflicts of interest has taken on greater 
significance in recent years such that most journals and medical societies have instituted 
some form of disclosure policy in order to uphold the fundamental integrity of scientific 
research. Nevertheless, the efficacy of these measures has not been elucidated and there 
is still very little data addressing the consistency of the disclosure information provided 
by authors performing investigations in the field of spine surgery.  Similarly, in an 
attempt to address these concerns and maintain the transparency of their faculty, many 
medical schools are continuing to revise their guidelines on COI. The purpose of this 
review was to evaluate the variability in the self-reported disclosures of physicians both 
in the professional arena (who present at national conferences to other practicing 
physicians) and the academic arena (who educate the rising physicians of tomorrow). 
 
COI in Orthopaedics 
 
These comparisons revealed a higher than anticipated prevalence of 
inconsistencies among the disclosure records of researchers participating in these three 
meetings. Despite the fact that both NASS and CSRS had requested acknowledgement of 
all industry affiliations (i.e. global disclosure), one out of every two authors (51%) who 
had attended both meetings exhibited contradictory information in the final programs 
with nearly half of them (44%) having three or more discrepancies. Although it is 
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conceivable that the number or type of an investigator’s financial relationships may have 
undergone some modification during the four months between the abstract submission 
deadlines for NASS (February 2008) and CSRS (June 2008), it certainly would not be 
expected for the disclosure status of so many of these individuals to change so 
dramatically within such a short period of time. In addition, 45% of this cohort declared 
no industry ties at one conference but identified at least one conflict of interest at the 
other, which suggests that the current guidelines are insufficient for establishing absolute 
transparency which is now more than ever necessary to maintain the public’s trust in the 
medical community.   
 One possible explanation for these irregularities is that while authors were 
instructed to inform NASS and CSRS of all industry connections regardless of their 
relevance to the studies being presented, they may have misinterpreted these instructions 
and only cited those disclosures that were pertinent to their work. Alternatively, these 
findings may reflect the inadvertent omission of one or more commercial entities by 
physicians who are less diligent in keeping records of their industry relationships. 
Another possibility is that there is simply a lack of effective penalties, for both authors 
and their corresponding industry liaisons, to correct naiveties in attitude where accurate 
disclosure is concerned. In either case, this analysis serves to quantify the significant 
degree of variability that exists between the self-reported global disclosure listings 
documented for the 2008 NASS and CSRS conferences. 
Of the remaining 49% of authors in the NASS/CSRS group who were not noted to 
have any discrepancies, a large majority (67%) indicated that they had nothing to 
disclose; similar percentages were also calculated for the SRS/NASS and SRS/CSRS data 
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sets as well (74% and 76%, respectively). Not surprisingly, it appears as if physicians are 
more likely to respond in a consistent fashion in the absence of any industry 
collaborations because they can presumably declare “no disclosures” across the board for 
all meetings. 
 Besides assessing the rate of inaccuracies between the information submitted to 
NASS and CSRS, we also evaluated the project-specific conflicts of interest collected by 
SRS with respect to the other societies with their global disclosure policies. The 
frequencies of irregularities in the SRS/NASS and SRS/CSRS cohorts were only 9% and 
18%, respectively, with most of these individuals possessing only a single discrepancy. 
Interestingly, 42% of individuals with inconsistencies cited one or more financial 
relationships at SRS but nothing at NASS; this percentage was even higher (50%) among 
those with studies at both SRS and CSRS.  Finally, the finding that a significant 
proportion of authors in each these groups (91% for SRS/NASS and 82% for SRS/CSRS) 
were consistent in their disclosures between these two conferences implies that authors 
may be more proficient at recognizing industry affiliations that are directly related to 
their investigations. 
This review emphasizes the extensive variability that existed in the self-reported 
disclosure information of authors presenting at three major spine conferences within the 
past year. Yet these implications most probably extend outside the particular subspecialty 
of spine to the larger field of orthopaedics as well, since orthopaedics is an area that has 
traditionally and continues to deal heavily with industry. If such discrepancies occur in 
major spine conferences, it is likely to occur in other areas as well, and it would be 
interesting to see further such studies in comparison to this one. If nothing else, it 
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behooves the readership to use the lessons presented here as an educational insight into a 
not-so-clear disclosure system, so that they can protect both themselves and their 
integrity.  
Rather than attributing these results to intentional duplicity, we believe that these 
disparities are most likely due to confusion regarding which financial relationships 
should be divulged in different situations given the lack of uniformity among the 
disclosure policies of these associations. It certainly appears as if authors are more 
proficient at identifying collaborations that are germane to their work than they are at 
imparting an accurate and comprehensive listing of every single one of their industry 
affiliations. Nevertheless, an inherent challenge associated with project-specific 
disclosure guidelines is that it may often be difficult for clinician-scientists to discern 
which financial ties are in fact relevant to their research. This risk of omission represents 
one of the primary reasons why many forums consider global disclosure to be the most 
effective strategy for establishing transparency. 
 Many organizations including NASS, CSRS, and SRS, have recognized the 
complex issues involved in the reporting of physician-industry relationships and are in 
the process of revising their disclosure policies so that they are better able to monitor 
these types of interactions and ensure that they are in accord with appropriate ethical 
benchmarks. Based on the relatively high frequency of inconsistencies evident in the 
disclosure information provided by spine surgeons at these meetings, we recommend that 
more explicit and standardized guidelines be elaborated by these societies in order to 
facilitate the accurate disclosure of financial relationships and to minimize their potential 
effects on scientific investigations. Be it a global disclosure policy or project-specific 
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disclosure policy that we ultimately implement, the policy should be a uniform one across 
all societies as a first step of many toward our goal of transparency. While it is true that 
the ultimate responsibility for reporting disclosures lies with the individual authors, the 
current protocols and policies regarding disclosure create an environment such that even 
the most diligent and forthcoming of authors may become labeled as “misreporters.”  
 
COI in Medical Education 
 
Based on our investigation, it is apparent that nearly all (98%) of the medical 
schools have some sort of policy requiring disclosure of industry ties to the institution 
itself. Furthermore, 92% of these institutions are also accredited by the ACCME and are 
therefore bound to their guidelines for CME activities. Conversely, a surprisingly small 
percentages of schools have formal policies insisting that faculty divulge their industry 
relationships to the students they teach or supervise in a laboratory setting (4% and 5%, 
respectively). The finding that only a small minority of medical schools mandates 
disclosure for student-directed activities may be indicative of the need for additional 
strategies to maximize transparency and further limit the influence of industry on 
academic pursuits. The concept of disclosure as a paradigm for managing possible COIs 
has been widely utilized by medical journals and societies, and it may be a viable option 
for medical schools as well. We expect the prevalence of these institution-driven 
regulatory policies to increase substantially during the coming years.    
Although the training programs for medicine and other professions are not 
entirely analogous, law schools were selected as a benchmark for comparison. Among the 
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institutions accredited by the ABA, only 18% had published disclosure policies and none 
appeared to expect speakers to inform students of corporate support or other COIs in the 
classroom or any other situation. Although the Association of American Law Schools 
(AALS) has recognized the significance of disclosure-related issues, there are still no 
formal guidelines that have been mandated for the institutions under its auspices [31]. 
This analysis also confirms that less than half (40%) of the medical schools had 
definite policies limiting the acceptance of gifts from third parties. Only 22% of these 
institutions prohibited faculty from receiving any items from commercial sources, 
regardless of their monetary value. While 18% of medical schools allowed for the 
provision of certain gifts that were of benefit to “academic pursuits” such as office 
supplies, honoraria, and travel reimbursements, these policies were often vague and 
subject to interpretation. Of note, 60% of medical schools had no such restrictions at all 
at the time of this study. Nevertheless, this percentage is much lower relative to that 
observed for law schools, of which merely 1% had implemented any type of strategy to 
curb this practice.   
We recognize that there are several limitations to this study. First, these findings 
are derived from the guidelines posted on the official internet website of each school so 
this review does not take into account internal documents that may exist regarding the 
management of industry relationships; because of delays in updating these websites, it is 
conceivable that these listings may not represent the most recent policies of these 
institutions. It is possible that a survey of these schools may have circumvented this 
problem but we elected not to send out questionnaires due to the potential for non-
responder bias and an inability to monitor whether the individuals who furnished the 
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requested information were fully familiar with their institutions’ complex disclosure 
protocols. As a result, we believe that the listings available on these schools’ websites are 
a relatively accurate reflection of their official policies.   
Given that virtually all medical schools have introduced some form of disclosure 
policy, it is obvious that the issue of COIs and their deleterious effects on faculty as well 
as the education of the next generation of practitioners has taken on greater importance. 
The significantly lower number of institutions requiring the reporting of financial 
relationships to students during educational activities and the variability in the degree to 
which they restrict the acceptance of gifts from commercial entities indicates that 
additional work needs to be done to develop more coherent guidelines to regulate these 
types of interactions. Over the coming years, the landscape of COIs and disclosure 
policies will continue to change significantly for both those in professional practice and 
those in education in the hopes that we not only maintain transparency throughout the 
entire process, but we also hold ourselves to the same standards we so often demand of 
others. 
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APPENDIX 
 
NASS disclosure instructions- 
“Financial relationships that have taken place within the last year are to be held to a 
robust disclosure standard. NASS members participating in an activity should disclose all 
financial relationships that have occurred within the last 12 months…” 
 
CSRS disclosure instructions- 
“All members shall disclose any personal or financial interest of conflicting fiduciary 
obligation that may introduce or be perceived to introduce bias. Disclosure information 
shall be updated annually.” 
 
SRS disclosure instructions- 
“It is the policy of Medical Education Resources (MER) and Scoliosis Research Society 
to ensure balance, independence, objectivity, and scientific rigor in all its educational 
activities. All faculty participating in our programs are expected to disclose any 
relationships they may have with commercial companies whose products or services may 
be mentioned so that participants may evaluate the objectivity of the presentations.”  
 
